The 7th Circuit holds that Kenosha County is covered by the federal statute criminalizing forced labor (18 U.S.C. §1589).

While this case is about civil detainees awaiting deportation hearings, there is language suggesting it applies equally to detainees charged with, but not yet convicted of, a crime.

The statute provides:

Whoever knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of a person by any one of, or by any combination of, the following means—

(1) by means of force, threats of force, physical restraint, or threats of physical restraint to that person or another person;

(2) by means of serious harm or threats of serious harm to that person or another person;

(3) by means of the abuse or threatened abuse of law or legal process; or

(4) by means of any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person to believe that, if that person did not perform such labor or services, that person or another person would suffer serious harm or physical restraint …

The county argued that this only applied to human trafficking, but the Seventh Circuit disagreed, holding that the title of the act was not relevant, and courts had to interpret the words of the statute.

The court distinguished the case of convicted people being required to work (which it decided in Taylor v. Salvation Army, 110 F.4th 1017, 1032 (7th Cir. 2024)), noting that no one in Congress remotely suggested that this act would upend nationwide practice of requiring such labor, and would potentially implicate the 13th Amendment. However, those concerns were not present with immigration detainees.

Why should this apply to people in jail awaiting trial? Two statements by the court suggest that it applies. First, the court noted that while some of the detainees had been charged with crimes, none had been convicted. Second, it specifically distinguished prisoners, who can be punished, and detainees, who can’t. Since pre-trial detainees similarly cannot be punished, the same logic should apply.